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ABSTRACT
Employing a sample of renowned U.S. inventors that combines biographical detail with information
on the patents they received over their careers, we highlight the impact of early U.S. patent
institutions in providing broad access to economic opportunity and in encouraging trade in new
technological knowledge. Through setting low fees and establishing administrative procedures for
application, the United States deliberately created a patent system that allowed a much wider range,
in socioeconomic class terms, of technologically creative individuals to obtain property rights to their
inventions than did European patent institutions. Moreover, by requiring that applications be
examined for novelty by technical experts, and by enforcing patent rights strictly, the U.S. system
reduced uncertainty about the validity of patent rights, and in that way lowered the cost of transacting
in them. Creating secure assets in new technological knowledge and facilitating access to markets
in technology in this way both stimulated specialization at invention and further enhanced the
opportunities available to technologically creative individuals who would otherwise have lacked the
capital to directly extract returns from their efforts. Indeed, we show that until the late 19th century,
the 'great inventors' of the U.S. generally had backgrounds that permitted them only limited formal
schooling, and made extensive use of their abilities under the patent system to extract returns from
trading their patent rights. The usefulness of the 19th century U.S. patent system to inventors with
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Intellectual property institutions have long played a central role in discussions of 
economic growth.  In recent years there has been a revival of concern with the impact of patent 
institutions on the rate and direction of inventive activity, and on technological change more 
generally.   Much of the analysis has focused on the most direct effects of granting an exclusive 
property right in technological knowledge: the enhanced returns that inventors can extract by 
enjoying a state-mandated monopoly on their discoveries; and the higher costs that users of new 
technologies or consumers of final goods have to bear as a result of a society’s recognizing 
property rights in technical information.  For some decades, the dominant stream of thought held 
that the dynamic gains associated with more rapid rates of technological progress, induced by 
offering greater material incentives to investors in research and development, outweighed the 
static losses suffered because of slower diffusion.  Scholars and policymakers have become 
increasingly skeptical about this calculus, however, with particular scrutiny of whether it is 
applicable to developing countries.  Their chief concerns are that strengthened intellectual 
property rights in developing-country contexts might lead to a high volume of licensing or 
royalty fees from these societies to the highly industrialized countries, and that there might not be 
much of a return in terms of higher domestic rates of invention or productivity growth.            
  This paper draws on economic history to highlight another feature of intellectual property 
whose significance has received little attention.  We argue that defining and enforcing a tradable 
asset in new technological knowledge is extremely important for fostering a market in 
technology, and for extending and increasing incentives for investment in inventive activity to 
segments of the population that would otherwise find it difficult to directly extract returns from 
their technological creativity.  The paper explores this feature in the context of an assessment of 
the evolution of intellectual property systems, and its impact on the course of technological   2 
progress in one of the early industrializers, the United States.  The historical perspective is 
valuable for appraising current issues, even though the effects and appropriateness of specific 
institutions such as patent system vary with the frontiers of technology as well as other 
circumstances which certainly change dramatically over time.   In our view, the repercussions of 
providing broad access to property rights in new technological knowledge may be much more 
relevant and favorable for developing economies today than is generally realized.    
   In order to demonstrate just how revolutionary the United States patent system was in 
providing broad access to a secure and well-defined asset in new technological knowledge, the 
second section of this paper discusses the development of patent institutions in Britain and 
France, relative to America.  Section III presents evidence regarding individuals who made 
contributions to the technological frontier in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  This 
part of the paper describes the composition of a sample of ‘great inventors’ and their patterns of 
patenting from 1790 through the 1930s.  We examine patterns of geographical location, mobility, 
nativity, and access to privileges such as schooling at institutions of higher learning.  Moreover, 
the data allow us to determine whether specific classes of ‘great inventors’ differed in their 
tendency to rely on the use of their patent as an asset that allowed them to extract returns from 
their technological creativity.  We conclude with a brief discussion of how the U.S. innovation of 
a modern patent system diffused over the 19
th century, and the relevance to developing countries 
today of that country’s experience with the role of institutions in fostering democratic invention.   
 
    II. EARLY PATENT SYSTEMS  
  A fundamental and enduring concern of organized society is the design of institutions that 
encourage private actors to undertake investments conducive to improvements in social welfare.  
It is therefore hardly surprising that there is a long history of public policies crafted to stimulate   3 
would-be inventors, innovators, and investors to contribute to the advance and diffusion of 
technological knowledge.   Appreciation of the potential importance of such policies grew over 
the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as it became clear that ongoing technological 
progress was feasible, capable of altering the fate of nations, and responsive to material 
incentives. A wide variety of schemes were introduced and debated at one time or another, but by 
the end of the nineteenth century patent systems, and especially the model provided by the U.S., 
emerged as the dominant method by which national governments promoted the growth of new 
technological knowledge. An institution that had been rather obscure a century before had come 
to be regarded as a virtual necessity for any country with plans to industrialize or modernize.
1      
  As emerging nations decided to establish or revise their patent institutions, they were able 
to draw from the examples and experiences of the three leading industrialized countries of the 
early nineteenth century, each of which was also something of a pioneer in formulating public 
policy toward technology.  Britain – the first industrial nation – stands out for having established 
a patent system which has been in operation for a longer period than any other in the world.
2  
Patents were granted “by grace of the Crown” and were subject to any restrictions that the 
government cared to impose, including the expropriation of the patent without compensation.  To 
a large degree by design, patent institutions offered rather limited incentives to inventors with 
only modest resources or to creators of incremental inventions.   Specific features of the British 
system made it difficult for an inventor who did not already command capital to obtain and use a 
patent as a well-defined asset to mobilize that capital from others, or to extract a return to his 
                                                       
1. Especially after the Crystal Palace Exhibition of 1851, there was a continued fascination with issues about patent 
systems, including whether patent systems were desirable for all countries, how they should be designed, and (for 
individuals) how to make money from them.  See Machlup and Penrose (1950) for an excellent account of one part 
of the debate.  Mark Twain was not far from the mainstream when he spoke through the “Connecticut Yankee in 
King Arthur’s Court”(p. 70): “[T]he very first official thing I did, in my administration – and it was on the very first 
day of it too – was to start a patent office; for I knew that a country without a patent office and good patent laws was 
just a crab and couldn’t travel any way but sideways or backways.”     4 
technological creativity by selling it off.  The orientation of the British system reflected a 
widespread view amongst that country’s elite that significant (in the sense of technologically 
important, not being easily discoverable by many people, and thus worthy of property protection) 
contributions in technical knowledge were unlikely to come from individuals who did not already 
have access to the means to absorb the cost of a patent or to exploit the invention directly through 
a commercial enterprise.   
  The Statute of Monopolies in 1624 offered a grant of a patent for fourteen years for “the 
sole making or working of any manner of new manufacture within this realm to the first and true 
inventor.”
3   But in Britain the interpretation of the “first and true inventor” included importers of 
inventions that had been created abroad, and seems to have also intruded on the determination of 
whether employers were entitled to patents on the ideas of their workers.
4   Not only were fees set 
extremely high (five to ten times annual per capita income well into the 19
th century), but 
potential patentees were well advised to obtain the help of a patent agent to aid in negotiating the 
numerous steps and offices that were required for a cumbersome process of application in 
London.   Before 1852 patent specifications were open to public inspection on payment of a fee, 
but they were not printed, published or indexed.
5  The complicated system also inhibited the 
diffusion of information and made it difficult, if not prohibitive, for inventors outside of London 
to conduct patent searches.     
  The defects of the British system led to numerous investigations and calls for institutional 
reform, especially after 1829.  But it was not until the Crystal Palace Exhibition in 1851, where 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 The standard references for the early British patent system are Christine Macleod (1988) and H I Dutton (1984). 
3 21 Jac. I. C. 3, 1623, Sec. 6.  
4 See Macleod (1999) for a discussion of how craftsmen in Britain  had to rely on other methods of extracting returns 
from their ideas about how to improve on technical practice. 
5  Since the patent could be filed in any of three offices in Chancery, searches of the prior art involved much time 
and inconvenience.  It is hardly surprising that the defenders of the early patent system included patent agents and 
patent lawyers.  Patent fees also provided an important source of revenues for the Crown and its employees, and   5 
American inventors shocked observers with their creativity and called attention to their 
innovative patent institution, that actual legislation was enacted to meet some of the longstanding 
criticisms.   In 1852 the British patent laws were revised in the first major adjustment of the 
system in two centuries.  The patent application process was rationalized into one single Patent 
Office, and the fee structure was adjusted. A renewal system was adopted, making it cheaper to 
initially obtain a patent, but one taken to full term remained just as costly as before.  The 1852 
reforms undoubtedly instituted improvements over the former opaque procedures, but the system 
remained one based on registration rather than examination, and procedures continued to 
discourage the technologically creative who did not already have substantial capital to draw on.   
  This absence of an examination system was, we argue, extremely important.  Without 
examination, there was great uncertainty about what a patent was really worth.  Before the 1852 
reform, for example, the lack of access to information about the specifications of patents already 
granted made it difficult to identify whether a purported invention (even one that had been 
patented) was truly novel and would stand up to challenge.  The legal system added to the 
prevailing uncertainty, and was biased against “mere” improvements.  Patents were valid only for 
inventions that were novel (which was of course difficult to determine before 1852) and useful, 
and courts did not hesitate to enforce both of these conditions.  Utility under the patent law was 
regarded as unrelated to the commercial success of the patented invention.  Since the legal 
system was unpredictable, patent rights could not be regarded as settled unless the patent had 
been contested in court with a favorable outcome.
6  Moreover, as the law did not offer any relief 
to the purchaser of a patent that ultimately proved invalid or worthless, potential purchasers were 
                                                                                                                                                                             
created a class who had strong incentives to block proposed reforms. 
6  According to an editorial in 1862, “there can be no doubt that a large amount of property is bound up in patent 
rights, and that the utmost uncertainty exists as to the legal value of that property” (Newton’s London Journal, cited 
in Coulter, p. 140).  Other constraints on the market for inventions related to policies towards assignments.  Ever 
vigilant to protect an unsuspecting public from fraudulent financial schemes on the scale of the South Sea Bubble,   6 
well advised to engage in extensive searches before entering into contracts.
7  When coupled with 
the lack of assurance inherent in a registration system, the purchase of a patent right involved a 
substantive amount of risk and high transactions costs -- all indicative of a speculative 
instrument.  It is therefore not surprising that the prevalence of assignments and licenses was 
significantly lower than in the U.S. (see Figure 1).
8   
  France provides another example of European institutions to promote invention and 
technical change.   French policies consisted of an extensive array of rewards and incentives, and 
illustrate the relative benefits and costs of alternative routes to statutory grants of patent rights.
9   
Although offering some striking contrasts with the approach taken by Britain, overall they were 
alike in offering quite limited incentives for technologically creative individuals without either 
comfortable means or high status to invest in developing their ideas.  The cost of obtaining 
patents was again very high relative to per capita income (much higher than in the U.S., though 
lower than in Britain).  Similarly, the reliance on a registration system, limited public disclosure 
of technical specifications, and the absence of a centralized way of tracking of assignments and 
patent ownership, all made it difficult for patentees to use their patents as secure and well-defined 
assets to mobilize capital or to extract significant returns through selling or licensing off his/her 
rights.  France was distinguished by its readiness to make extensive use of other means of 
rewarding inventors and innovators, but those sorts of returns were uncertain, especially since the 
processes involved in identifying those deserving of support tended to favor individuals who 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ownership of patent rights was limited to five investors (later extended to twelve).   
7 The case law on licenses was more convoluted.  See for instance Lawes v. Purser, 6 Ell. and Bl. 930, where a 
licensee refused to continue payments on the grounds that the patent was void.  It was held that the licensee could 
not make such a defense as long as the contract for the invalid patent had been executed without fraud. 
8 The markedly higher ratio of assignments to patents in the U.S. is all the more significant, both because the British 
figures are biased upward by the inclusion of licenses, and because the higher costs of obtaining a patent in Britain 
should, at least in principle (if screening by cost was a good substitute for screening by examination), have led to 
patents of higher average quality.    
9 Excellent assessments of such issues during the Enlightenment include Liliane Hilaire-Perez’s thesis, “Inventions   7 
already established economically, professionally, or socially.     
  Before the Revolution, the advance of technology was encouraged by the state granting 
inventors or introducers of inventions titles, pensions that sometimes extended to spouses and 
offspring, loans (some interest-free), lump-sum grants, bounties or subsidies for production, 
exemptions from taxes, or monopoly grants in the form of exclusive privileges.  Alternatives to 
formal privileges illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of awards that were administered by 
the state on a case- by- case basis.   These primarily nonmarket methods of allocation tended to 
be administratively costly and were imbued with the potential for corruption.  It is, and was, 
evident that a system of grants and privileges could be arbitrary and based on non-economic 
criteria.  Eighteenth-century correspondence and records provide numerous examples of awards 
that were made based on court connections.   Members of the scientific community who 
examined applications were not necessarily qualified to assess the potential value of many of the 
inventions.  Moreover, the administrative and opportunity costs of such a system were nontrivial 
on the part of both supplicants and the state bureaucracy.   Inventors were also aware that 
promises extended to them as inducements were not necessarily enforceable once the inventor 
had made fixed investments or made his discovery.
10     The technologically creative who were 
lacking in wealth, status, or connections to individuals who enjoyed these privileges, were at a 
pronounced disadvantage.        
  It was this complex network of state policies towards inventors and their inventions that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
et Inventeurs en France et en Angleterre au XVIIIe siecle,” and L' invention technique au siecle des Lumieres, Paris : 
Albin Michel, 2000. 
10 The famous English textile inventor, John Kay, illustrates the asymmetries involved in individual bargains struck 
with state authorities.  Kay settled in France because of promises to subsidize the transfer of technology and 
substantially aided in the diffusion of textile machinery. The Society for the Encouragement of Arts and 
Manufacturing in England promised him a generous award to return there, but then reneged once he was in London.  
Kay wrote early in 1761 to Prudaine de Montigny, Conseiller d’Etat in London, to explore the possibility of 
receiving French financial aid if he again immigrated to Paris.   Later that same year, Kay wrote to M. de Brou, 
Intendant de Rouen, to complain that he was still not receiving the pension he had been promised.     8 
was replaced after the outbreak of the French Revolution.  The modern French patent system was 
established according to the laws of 1791 (amended in 1800) and 1844.  The Revolutionary 
Assembly intended to avoid the excesses involved in previous grants of privileges, and 
proclaimed that it had drafted the outlines of a system that constituted a distinct break with the 
past.  But in effect, as Alexis de Tocqueville pointed out, many features of the institutions of the 
ancien regime survived the revolution, and this was no less evident in the workings of the patent 
system.
11  The 1791 statute stipulated patent fees that were costly, ranging from 300 livres 
through 1500 livres, and the high price of protection led to difficulties for inventors from 
ordinary backgrounds.  Patentees filed through a simple registration system without any need to 
specify what was new about their claim, and could persist in obtaining the grant even if warned 
that the patent was likely to be invalid.  Indeed, on each patent document the following caveat 
was printed: “The government, in granting a patent without prior examination, does not in any 
manner guarantee either the priority, merit or success of an invention.”
12   
  The French patent statutes included a statement regarding the right of the public to view 
patent specifications, which echoed the “bargain” theory of patents that underlay American and 
                                                       
11 See the Decret du 30 Decembre 1790, in the Code des Pensions, p. 45.  Although the legal rhetoric implied that the 
primary intent of the legislation was to recognize the natural rights of inventors, the actual clauses led to results that 
were different and reflected former mercantilist policies.     In an obvious attempt to limit international diffusion of 
French discoveries, until 1844 patents were voided if the inventor attempted to obtain a patent overseas on the same 
invention.   On the other hand, the first introducer of an invention covered by a foreign patent would enjoy the same 
“natural rights” as the patentee of an original invention or improvement, although the term would expire at the same 
time as any foreign patent on the item.  In order to qualify for a patent of importation, the applicant had to have 
obtained practical knowledge of how the item worked through personal risk and effort, although he was not obliged 
to prove that the invention had been patented elsewhere nor to even state its country of origin.  The rights of 
patentees were also restricted if the invention related to items that were controlled by the French government, such as 
printing presses and firearms. 
12 Since France during the ancien regime was likely the first country to introduce systematic examinations of 
applications for privileges, it is somewhat ironic that commentators point to the retention of registration without 
prior examination as the defining feature of the “French system.” In 1968 a partial examination system was adopted 
which was similar to the early British reforms along these lines, since it did not include a search for novelty, merely 
a test for accordance with the law: “[il] se situe a mi-chemin entre la libre deliverance et l’examen prealable ... en 
effet, l’administration n’avait pas les moyens de pratiquer un tel examen.” (P. 21, La Procedure Francaise de 
Delivrance des Brevets d’Invention, Yves Marcellin, Editions Cedat, Rosny-Sous-Bois.)  The changes were made to 
give value to patents and to protect the interests of third parties.  It was only in 1978 that an examination for novelty   9 
British grants.   In return for the limited monopoly right, the patentee was expected to describe 
the invention in such terms that a workman skilled in the arts could replicate the invention and 
this information was expected to be “rendue publique”.   However, since no provision was made 
for the publication or diffusion of these descriptions, in effect the statutory clause was a dead 
letter.  At least until the law of April 7 1902, specifications were only available in manuscript 
form in the office in which they had originally been lodged, and printed information was limited 
to brief titles in patent indexes.
13   Moreover, the state remained involved in the discretionary 
promotion of invention and innovation through policies beyond the granting of patents such as 
cash awards and purchase of patent rights. As a result, inventors had an incentive to direct their 
attention to rent seeking activities as well as to productive efforts to commercialize their 
discoveries.  Patent assignments were filed in the office of the Prefect for the district, but since 
there was no central source of information it was difficult to trace the records for specific 
inventions.  Like patents themselves, assignments and licenses were issued with a caveat emptor 
clause.  This was partially due to the nature of patent property under a registration system, and 
partially to the uncertainties of legal jurisprudence in this area.  In short, according to an 
informed 19
th century observer, patent rights evinced a “remarkably hazardous and uncertain 
nature.”  The basic structure and principles of the French patent system set forth in these early 
French statutes endured until after World War II. 
  The framers of the U.S. Constitution and its early laws were bold, ambitious, and 
optimistic, and helped set the new nation on an institutional trajectory that was radically different 
from any in the Old World.  One of the areas in which they made this dramatic break was in the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
was introduced. 
13 The law of 1844 only allowed for the publication of the full text of patents that were judged to be important.  The 
attempt to obtain information was also inhibited by restrictions placed on access – viewers had to state their motives; 
foreigners had to be assisted by French attorneys; and no extract from the manuscript could be copied until the 
patent had expired.  “C’est donc bien avec la loi de 1902 que le brevet a definitivement perdu son charactere de   10 
patent system they constructed.  The so-called Founding Fathers took the design of intellectual 
property institutions very seriously:  for the first time in the world an intellectual property clause 
was introduced in a national constitution; the intellectual property clause was approved 
unanimously and the law establishing the patent system was one of the first passed by Congress; 
and prominent figures such as James Madison and George Washington played key roles in 
spelling out the provisions.   The framers quite self-consciously made major changes to the 
structures employed in Europe, and nearly all of their alterations can be viewed as strengthening 
and extending incentives and opportunities for inventive activity to classes of the population that 
would not have enjoyed them under traditional intellectual property institutions.   
  The framers of the U.S. Constitution and of its early laws were familiar with European 
precedents, and so it might be reasonably inferred that their innovations in design were self-
conscious and deliberate.  The intellectual property clause providing for the patent and copyright 
statutes appears in the very first Article of the U.S. Constitution, whereby Congress was 
instructed to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”  From 
what record of their thinking survives, the framers were intent on crafting a new type of system 
that would promote learning, technology, and commercial development, as well as create a 
repository of information on prior art.   Their chosen approach to accomplishing these objectives 
was based on providing broad access to property rights in technology, which was achieved 
through low fees and an application process that was impersonal and relied on routine 
administrative procedures. Congress debated the question of appropriate fees, and the first patent 
law in 1790 set the rate at the minimal sum of $3.70 plus copy costs.   In 1793 the fees were 
increased to $30 (less than 5 percent of those prevailing in Britain), and were maintained at this 
                                                                                                                                                                             
document d’archives.” Brevets d’Invention Francais, 1791-1902, p. 12.     11 
level until 1861.  In that year, they were raised to $35, and the term was changed from fourteen 
years (with the possibility of an extension) to seventeen years (with no extensions.) 
  Incentives for generating new technological knowledge were also fine-tuned by requiring 
that the patentee be “the first and true inventor” anywhere in the world. The law employed the 
language of the British statute in granting patents to "the first and true inventor," but unlike in 
Britain, the phrase was used literally, to grant patents for inventions that were original in the 
world, not simply within U.S. borders.   Moreover, a condition of the patent award was that the 
specifications of the invention be available to the public immediately on the issuance of the 
patent.
14  This latter condition not only sped the diffusion of technological knowledge, but also -- 
when coupled with strict enforcement of patent rights -- aided in the commercialization of the 
technology.  That strict enforcement was indeed soon forthcoming.  Within a few decades the 
federal judiciary evolved rules and procedures to enforce the rights of patentees and their 
assignees, and clearly considered the protection of the property right in new technological 
knowledge to be of vital importance.
15  Unlike in Britain, patent property was secured by the 
“Supreme Law of the land” (the Constitution) and, once granted, could not be overturned except 
for cases of outright fraud. 
  Another distinctive feature of the U.S. system of great significance was the requirement 
that all applications be subject to an examination for novelty.  For the first few years after the 
                                                       
14 American legislators were concerned with ensuring that information about the stock of patented knowledge was 
readily available and diffused rapidly.    As early as 1805 Congress stipulated that the Secretary of State should 
publish an annual list of patents granted the preceding year, and after 1832 also required the publication in 
newspapers of notices regarding expired patents.  The Patent Office in Washington itself was a source of centralized 
information on the state of the arts, but it also maintained repositories throughout the country, where inventors could 
forward their patent models at the expense of the Patent Office.  Rural inventors could apply for patents without 
significant obstacles, because applications could be submitted by mail free of postage. 
15 See Khan 1995.  Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, the acknowledged intellectual property expert of the early 
courts, succinctly stated the dominant perspective in Lowell v. Lewis [15 F. Cas. 1018 (1817)]: “[T]he inventor has a 
property in his invention; a property which is often of very great value, and of which the law intended to give him 
the absolute enjoyment and possession ... involving some of the dearest and most valuable rights which society 
acknowledges, and the constitution itself means to favor.”    12 
Patent Act of 1790 was passed, a committee comprising the Secretaries of State and War, and the 
Attorney General examined the patent applications.  This provision proved unwieldy and was 
replaced by a registration system in 1793, whereby disputes about the validity of a patent were to 
be resolved by the judiciary.  The Patent Act of 1836 re-introduced the examination system, in a 
structure that remains in use today.  Each application was to be scrutinized by technically trained 
examiners to ensure that the invention conforms to the law and constitutes an original advance in 
technology.
16   Approval from technical experts reduced uncertainty about the validity of the 
patent, and meant that the inventor could more easily use the grant to either mobilize capital to 
commercially develop the patented technology, or to sell or license off the rights to an individual 
or firm better positioned to directly exploit it.   Private parties could always, as they did under the 
registration systems prevailing in Europe, expend the resources needed to make the same 
determination as the examiners, but there was a distributional impact, as well as scale economies 
and positive externalities, associated with the government’s absorbing the cost of certifying a 
patent grant as legitimate and making the information public.
17   Trade in patented technologies 
was, as a result, much more extensive – even on a per patent basis – in the U.S. than elsewhere.   
Technologically creative people without the capital to go into business and directly exploit the 
fruits of their ingenuity were major beneficiaries. 
  It was not coincidental that the U.S. system was extraordinarily favorable to trade in 
patent rights.  From the special provision made in the 1793 law for keeping a public registry of 
                                                       
16 Although the statutes proposed to grant patents for “new and useful” inventions, in practice the utility claim was 
never enforced.  Courts declared that it was up to the market, not to administrators, to determine what was useful. In 
the 1817 case, Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, Joseph Story charged the jury that the utility of the invention "is a 
circumstance very material to the interest of the patentee, but of no importance to the public.  If it is not extensively 
useful, it will silently sink into contempt and disregard." It was the role of the market, rather than the courts, to 
determine the ultimate success of the patent.   This policy was continued by the Patent Office, which also did not 
attempt to gauge the social or technical value of an invention, deciding conflicting claims predominantly on the 
basis of novelty. 
17 See Dutton 1984 and MacLeod 1988 and 1999.   13 
all assignments onward, it is clear that the framers of the system expected and desired an 
extensive market in patents to develop.  It was well understood that the patent system enhanced 
potential private and social returns to invention all the more, by defining and extending broad 
access to tradable assets in technological knowledge to a wide spectrum of the population.  A 
market orientation enabled patentees to extract income (or raise capital) from their ideas by 
selling them off to a party better positioned for commercial exploitation, and thereby encouraging 
a division of labor that helped creative individuals specialize in their comparative advantage.  
The U.S. system extended the protection of property rights to a much broader range of inventions 
than obtained in Britain or elsewhere in Europe (largely through the lower costs) and, when 
coupled with effective enforcement of the rights of the “first and true inventor,” this meant that 
inventors could advantageously reveal information about their ideas to prospective buyers even 
before they received a patent grant.   By the mid-1840s, trade in patents (and patenting) was 
booming, and growing legions of patent agents or lawyers had set up shop in major cities and 
other localities where rates of patenting were high.  Although these agents focused initially on 
helping inventors obtain patents under the new system, it was not long before they assumed a 
major role in the marketing of inventions.
18   
Overall, there is no serious question that the United States patent system constituted a 
dramatic break from European antecedents as regards policies to promote technological advance.   
                                                       
18 By the mid-1840s, for example, a number of national patent agencies had begun to publish periodicals (such as 
Scientific American) that popularized invention as a career path for the ambitious and talented.  Over time, 
intermediation in this market for technology grew ever more articulated in a process not unlike the evolution of 
financial intermediaries. Patent agents and lawyers became increasingly specialized and were drawn into activities 
such as the provision of advice to inventors about the prospects for various lines of inventive activity, and the 
matching not only of buyers with sellers of patents but also of inventors with individuals seeking to invest in the 
development of new technologies.   As the extent of the market for technology expanded over the course of the 
nineteenth century, creative individuals with a comparative advantage in technology appear to have increasingly 
specialized in inventive activity.  This tendency was likely reinforced by the increasing importance to inventors of 
specialized technical knowledge as technology became more complex. For evidence and more discussion, see:  
Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 1996, 1999, 2001, and 2003; Khan and Sokoloff 1993 and 2001; and Khan 2004.     14 
The framers of the U.S. patent institutions held quite different expectations, relative to those of 
their counterparts in Europe, about the extent to which individuals from relatively ordinary or 
humble backgrounds could contribute to new technological knowledge, and about how 
responsive that group would be to expanded opportunities for realizing returns from inventive 
activity.  The structure of the U.S. system was based on the conception that a wide range of 
individuals, whatever their social origins and standing, were capable of making significant 
contributions to the advance of technological knowledge, but that in order to realize that 
potential, broad access to property rights in their knowledge had to be provided.  Such rights 
were especially critical for the technologically creative of limited means.  Without clear and 
secure property rights to their inventions, how could they hope to mobilize the capital to exploit 
them directly?  Certainly, without such property rights (dependent both on their ability to obtain a 
patent, and on a high likelihood – enhanced by the examination system -- that it would stand up 
in court to a legal challenge), problems of asymmetric information and other high transactions 
costs would plague the attempts of inventors to attract investors, just as they would complicate 
the working out of arrangements between employers and employees to encourage the latter to 
develop their ideas for improvement and offer them up.  Access to such rights was to be 
enhanced by lower fees, an examination system that bolstered confidence that a patent would 
stand up to challenge, and by a judicial system that was effective at enforcement.  Requirements 
of immediate full disclosure of technical specifications stimulated further progress, as the 
technologically creative could more easily learn about and build on what had been discovered. 
Such measures also encouraged a market in patented technologies that would both aid inventors 
in using their patents as collateral to attract investments and increase the returns to their 
inventions.   
One would expect this system to have led to a more socially diverse composition of   15 
inventors and, in previous work, based on general samples of patentees, we showed how 
individuals from elite backgrounds accounted for a much smaller proportion of patentees in the 
U.S. than they did in Britain during the early 19
th century.
19  Because many patents are of little or 
no value, however, this evidence may not conclusively demonstrate that providing broader and 
stronger incentives for inventive activity was of much technological significance.
20  Indeed, 
many observers, including those who were influential in maintaining the more socially restrictive 
patent systems that predominated in Europe until late in the 19
th century, thought that little in the 
way of new technology that was novel or important could be expected from individuals who 
lacked sufficient capital to obtain patents and fund their commercial application: 
  even with the present expense there are so many trifling patents taken out.  If the  
fee was much higher, parties that are now taking out patents for little speculative 
things …would not take them out.  They are something like the dog in the manger; 
they prevent the public from benefiting by the invention or improvements on it for 
fourteen years, and yet do not benefit themselves.
21 
The next section of the paper therefore examines the backgrounds and careers of individuals who 
made contributions at the frontiers of technology, in order to determine the role of the patent 
system in providing broad access to opportunities for deriving income from investments in 
inventive activity.  The focus on inventors who achieved renown for their contributions to the 
advance of technology seems fully appropriate for assessing whether the democratic orientation 
of the U.S. system supported important advances in technology. 
                                                       
19 Khan and Sokoloff 1998. 
20 Sokoloff 1988; Sokoloff and Khan 1990; and Khan and Sokoloff 1993. 
21 So testified Charles Few to the Select Committee on the Law Relative to Patents for Invention, on May 15, 1829. 
See British Parliamentary Papers 1968, Reports from Select Committees on the Law Relative to Patents for 




III. EVIDENCE FROM THE ‘GREAT INVENTORS’ IN THE UNITED STATES 
The idea that patent institutions might matter for the rate of invention, by either a group or 
the entire population, is based on the judgment that inventors (and those who invest resources to 
support their activity) are motivated in part by the prospects of realizing material returns.  As we 
have shown in previous work, early 19
th century U.S. inventors were indeed highly 
entrepreneurial and quite sensitive to the potential gains that could be extracted from their 
discoveries.  Some scholars might agree with this characterization, but still contend that the roster 
of patents was limited to trivial improvements that were only of marginal relevance to the sources 
of productivity growth and technological change.  A common argument is that economic growth 
depended on discrete advances vested in such “great inventions” as the telegraph, the railroad and 
the steam engine, and that such ideas were generated through a different process.  We drew on 
the Dictionary of National Biography to locate those “great inventors” who were active in the 
U.S. at some point during their careers and born before 1886, and traced their patenting through 
1930, in order to examine how different their patterns of behavior were from those of patentees in 
general.  For each of the more than 400 inventors (all men except for one woman), we collected 
biographical information as well as the records of a substantial proportion of the patents (roughly 
4500 out of 16,900) they were awarded over their careers 
Overall, we find that the so-called great inventors were quite similar to ordinary 
patentees.  Indeed, to the extent they differed, it was because they were even more 
entrepreneurial or influenced by markets.  Not only did their patenting activity vary pro-
cyclically, as did patenting overall, but they often shifted the  direction of their inventive activity 
(as reflected in patents) when exogenous events such as the Civil War altered the relative returns   17 
that could be expected from different sorts of inventions.
22  It is also telling that more than 95 
percent of the great inventors patented at least some of their inventions, and an even higher 
percentage took positive action to derive material benefit from them.
23    
Table 1 provides another powerful indication that inventors, and great inventors 
especially, were concerned with material returns.  This is reflected in the tendency for inventors 
to disproportionately cluster in geographic areas (such as New England and the Middle Atlantic) 
with better or easier access to low-cost transportation (such as navigable internal waterways) and 
to the institutional supports underlying the market for technology (such as patent agents and 
lawyers).
24  This geographic pattern is not explained by geographic differences in schooling 
levels or in the distribution of manufacturing workers.  Rather it seems consistent with the notion 
that inventors were more likely to focus on inventive activity if they were in (due either to birth 
or selective migration) locations where returns to inventive activity were higher.
25  Geographic 
differentials in patenting seem to have initially (during the early 19
th century) been rooted in 
transportation-based disparities in access to broad markets, but persisted over time especially 
since institutional supports to carrying out and profiting from invention tended to cluster where 
patenting was higher.  The self-reinforcing pattern was completed when technologically creative 
individuals chose to move to those places where the market for technology was concentrated, in 
order to better realize the returns to their specializing at their comparative advantage in inventive 
                                                       
22 Sokoloff 1988; and Khan and Sokoloff 1993. 
23 This claim is based on a presumption that the ‘great inventors’ who were employees (a distinct minority as will be 
made clear), did take positive action to derive benefit.  From the biographies we have read, there were only a few 
inventors who did not try to realize some returns from their efforts.  Nearly all patented their inventions, but some 
did not.   Only three of the cohort born after 1820 did not obtain patent protection.   
24 In previous work, we showed that both overall inventors, and especially great inventors, were highly 
disproportionately concentrated in counties with access to water transportation (prior to railroads).  See Sokoloff 
1988 and Khan and Sokoloff 1993. For evidence that patent agents and other indicators of the market for technology 
came to be disproportionately concentrated in those areas (mostly in New England and the Middle Atlantic), see 
Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 1996, 1999a, 1999b, and 2003.     18 
activity.
26  A final illustration of how entrepreneurial the great inventors were is the high rate of 
migration evident in all of the birth cohorts (see Table 2).  The rates of inter-state migration we 
estimate from their places of birth and their residences during the years they received patents are 
much higher than those for the general population at similar ages.
27  
One of the key issues for our study is whether the framers of the U.S patent institutions 
were correct in their assumption that individuals from modest or undistinguished backgrounds 
were capable of playing important roles in pushing out the technological frontier.  Although the 
biographies contain some information about the parents of the great inventors (see Table 2 for the 
occupations of their fathers), the relative paucity of data on the wealth holdings of the parents 
limits its usefulness for our purposes here.  Instead, we take advantage of the abundant detail on 
the formal schooling and training the great inventors received early in their work or career 
histories.  Historians of education agree, and the biographies confirm, that the age at which a 
young male left school and began to work was strongly associated with the economic resources 
of the parents during the 19
th century.
28  This pattern stemmed both from most of the nation’s 
secondary schools and universities being private and thus requiring significant tuition until late in 
the 1800s, as well as the opportunity cost of an individual at school in lieu of at work.  The 
evidence on the extent of formal schooling among the great inventors, therefore, bears not only 
the significance of having received a higher level (and course of study) of formal schooling for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
25 See Khan and Sokoloff 1993, for evidence that great inventors during the early 19
th century were both more likely 
to be born in counties with low-cost access to broad markets, and to migrate to such counties.  Both factors 
contributed to the highly disproportionate concentration of great inventors in such counties. 
26 See Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 1996 and 1999 for more discussion. 
27 Joseph Ferrie very kindly provided estimates of the inter-state migration rates from the random sample of the 
native-born population that he has collected from the late-19
th century public-use census records, for groups at 
comparable ages.  He agrees that the great inventors seem to have been much more geographically mobile than the 
general population.  It is also worth noting how the foreign born are disproportionately represented among the great 
inventors of the United States.  This is consistent with the idea that the technologically creative in Europe were more 
likely to migrate across the Atlantic because of greater opportunities – some of which may have associated with the 
patent system.   19 
being capable of making important contributions to technology, but also on what sort of material 
circumstances they came from.     
Figure 2 displays the distributions of patents across classes of great inventors 
distinguished in terms of the amount and type of formal schooling they received, and arrayed by 
birth cohort.  It reveals that from the very earliest group (those born between 1739 and 1794) 
through the birth cohort of 1820 to 1845, roughly 75 to 80 percent of patents went to those with 
only primary or secondary schooling.
29  So modest were the educational backgrounds of these 
first generations of great American inventors, that 70 percent of those born during 1739-94 had at 
best a primary education (at least as formally provided), with the proportion dropping to only just 
above 59 percent among those who entered the world between 1795 and 1819.   Given that these 
birth cohorts were active and indeed dominant until the very last decades of the 19
th century, 
these figures unambiguously indicate that people of rather humble backgrounds were capable of 
making important contributions to technological knowledge.  Those who had received some 
schooling at institutions of higher learning are admittedly over-represented, as the proportions of 
cohorts graduating from secondary school or college were lower than 10 percent and 3 percent 
respectively as late as 1900.
30  But what is most striking is how individuals who had not enjoyed 
the advantages associated with a more advanced education accounted for such a large share of 
major inventions, and that those trained in engineering and/or the natural sciences (in college or 
                                                                                                                                                                             
28 See Cubberley 1920, for a discussion of how the schools, and the backgrounds of the students who attended them, 
evolved over the 19
th century.  
29 Those classified as receiving only a primary education encompass a range from those who spent no time in school 
to those who attended school until about age 12.  Those who were identified as spending any years in an academy or 
who attended school after the age of 12 (but did not attend a college or seminary) were placed in the secondary 
schooled category.  Those who spent any time at all in college were either counted in the college category, or – if 
they had attended a school with an engineering orientation or followed a course of study in medicine or a natural 
science – in the engineering/natural science.    
30 See Snyder 1993, figures 11 and 17.  The rates of graduation from  secondary school and college were  markedly 
higher in the Northeast and East North Central regions, where inventive activity was disproportionately concentrated 
throughout the 19
th century however.  See Cubberley 1920 and 1947 for discussion of the regional patterns in 
schooling.     20 
beyond) did not play a major role until the birth cohort of 1846 to 1865.   Moreover, in all of the 
birth cohorts, the great inventors who had only primary or secondary education received as many 
(and often more) patents over their careers as did their peers with more extensive formal 
schooling.   The less-educated inventors also seem to have produced as valuable or technically 
significant inventions.  Their patents were just as likely to be assigned, and just as likely to be 
cited in applications for patents from later inventors.   Thus, the technologically creative seem to 
have been able to accumulate the skills and knowledge necessary to operate at the frontier largely 
on their own, or through their work experience as apprentices or younger employees, up until the 
Second Industrial Revolution.
31   
Some skeptics might suggest that the great inventors who had to make do with little or no 
formal schooling were not so disadvantaged.  That is perhaps the point, at least as regards the 
sources of technological creativity, but this should not be interpreted as meaning that this class of 
great inventors was as well off in material terms as those who went to college.  Matthias 
Baldwin, James Eads, George Eastman, Thomas Edison, and Elias Howe are among the many 
great inventors who were compelled to go to work at an early age to support themselves or their 
families, and thus to forego much in the way of formal schooling.  A perhaps more fundamental 
question is whether this class of inventors was especially advantaged by the structure of the U.S. 
patent system, where the cost of obtaining a property right in the new technological knowledge 
one had discovered was low, the State supported strict enforcement of those rights, and where 
(between 1790 and 1793, and from 1836 onward) the patent office invested substantial resources 
in determining the validity of patents before they were granted.    
                                                       
31 The differences in patent systems had implications for how apprenticeship worked, and the effective rights of 
workers to technological improvements they generated, in Britain and the United States.  See Fisk 1998 and 
MacLeod 1999. 
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The biographies suggest that inventors with only primary or secondary schooling had 
more limited financial resources than those who were able to attend college.  Given the financial 
institutions of that era, inventors lacking in wealth would surely have found it much more 
difficult to extract a return from their inventions, if they had to mobilize the capital to start or 
conduct a business on their own to exploit their idea directly without patent protection.  The 
lower cost of obtaining a patent, and the certification that stemmed from having successfully 
passed an examination screening, should have made it much easier for inventors to market the 
new technology and either extract returns by selling off or licensing the rights to a firm better 
positioned for commercial exploitation, or to attract investment (by offering shares in a firm 
whose assets consisted largely of the patent rights to the new technology or commitments by the 
inventor) to support the continued efforts of the inventor.   
Our evidence does indeed suggest that these features of the U.S. patent system were 
highly beneficial to inventors, and especially to those whose wealth would not have allowed them 
to directly exploit their inventions through manufacturing or other business activity.  The ability 
to obtain patents provided a means for individuals whose chief asset was technological creativity, 
or accumulated human capital that was conducive to inventive activity, to extract a return from 
their talents by focusing on invention.  Table 3 shows that a remarkably high proportion of the 
great inventors, generally near or above half, extracted much of the income from their inventions 
by selling or licensing off the rights to them.  Moreover, it was just those groups that one would 
expect to be most concerned to trade their intellectual property that were indeed the most actively 
engaged in marketing their inventions.  The great inventors with only a primary school education 
were most likely to realize the income from their inventions through sale or licensing, whereas 
those with a college education in a non-technical field were generally among the least likely to   22 
follow that strategy.
32  With the exception of the birth cohort of 1739 to 1794 (where there are 
relatively few observations), the college-educated inventors were much more likely than others to 
extract the returns to their technological creativity by being a proprietor or principal in a firm that 
directly exploited the technology in production.
33   Inventors who chose to realize the fruits of 
their technological creativity in this way might not seem to have been so affected by the patent 
system, but in fact even this group benefited.  They were obviously helped by holding a 
monopoly on the use of the respective technology, but many of them were also aided in 
mobilizing capital for their firms by being able to report patents (or contracts committing patents 
granted in the future) as assets.   Patent portfolios were especially useful as a signal for those who 
wished to attract venture capital for exceptionally innovative projects that might otherwise have 
seemed overly risky.
34 
The estimates in Table 3 of the relative prevalence of the approaches used by the great 
inventors to derive income from their inventions also indicate that the reliance on sales and 
licensing is quite high among the first birth cohort (51.4 percent on average), and remains high 
(62.1, 44.0, and 66.0 percent in the next three cohorts), until a marked decline among the last 
birth cohort, those born between 1866 and 1885.  The proportion of great inventors who relied 
extensively on sales or licensing of patented technologies fell sharply from the levels of 
preceding cohorts, and there was a rise in the proportion that realized their returns through long-
term associations (as either principals or employees) with a firm that directly exploited the 
                                                       
32 Although a bit less striking, the inventors who had studied engineering or a natural science were also, for a time 
(the middle three birth cohorts), much more inclined to rely on sales or licensing of their inventions to realize 
income.  This pattern might be explained as due to these inventors choosing to specialize in what their human capital 
gave them a comparative advantage in – inventive activity – and leaving it to others to carry out the commercial 
exploitation.    
33 Many of the college educated of the 1739-94 birth cohort were evidently not so concerned with realizing a return 
from their inventions.   Fourteen percent of the college educated, and more than one third of those who studied 
engineering or natural science chose not to pursue returns to their inventions.  This attitude, however admirable, was 
not shared by inventors that came from less privileged backgrounds.     23 
technologies. This finding parallels that of Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (1999a), whose analysis of 
different data indicated that there was a substantial increase in the likelihood of the most 
productive inventors forming long-term attachments with a particular assignee over the late-19
th 
and early 20th centuries.
35   
The patterns of variation over educational class and time in the relative prevalence of the 
different approaches employed by inventors in realizing the returns to their inventive activity, 
and in the relative productivity or prominence of different sub-groups at invention, are both 
fascinating and complex.  We have highlighted the role of a revolutionary, low-cost, 
examination-based patent system which, when coupled with favorable legal institutions and 
strong enforcement, not only encouraged a broad range of creative individuals and firms to invest 
more in inventive activity, but was especially crucial for those who began without much in the 
way of resources except for their technological creativity.    A key feature of the story, however, 
is that much of the population possessed some familiarity with the basic elements of technology 
during this era.  Moreover, apprenticeship or the widespread practice of leaving home during 
adolescence to pick up skills in a trade, a traditional social institution for the transmission and 
accumulation of more detailed technological knowledge, was both widely accessible and capable 
of adapting to many of the new developments and to the general quickening of the pace of 
advance over the 19
th century.  Technologically creative individuals without the resources to 
attend institutions of higher learning thus had avenues for acquiring the skills and knowledge 
necessary to be effective at invention, and could later take advantage of the access to 
opportunities for inventive activity grounded in the patent system.   Good things generally come 
                                                                                                                                                                             
34 Lamoreaux, Levenstein, and Sokoloff 2004. 
35 Although deeply impressed with how well this result fits with the work of Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 1999a and 
2003, some caution may be warranted.  Because the Dictionary of American Biography was originally prepared 
during the 1920s, our sample does not include as many great inventors born after 1865 as we would like.  We would 
feel a bit more secure with more observations.   24 
to an end, eventually, and in this case circumstances changed over time with the evolution of 
technology.   Formal knowledge of science and engineering became increasingly important for 
making significant contributions at the technological frontier, particularly with the so-called 
Second Industrial Revolution, and the cost of carrying out inventive activity rose.  Both of these 
developments served to narrow the range of the population that could generate important 
inventions, at least to the extent that technologically creative individuals from humble origins 
found it difficult to gain access to the programs in engineering or natural sciences which 
proliferated with the expansion of land-grant state universities during the late-19
th century.  
Given the much higher costs of conducting inventive activity, those who were supplying the 
capital to fund such endeavors may have reasonably desired more in the way of credentials, as 
well as long-term commitments, from those they were supporting.  This interpretation is 
obviously somewhat speculative, but does seem to be consistent with the patterns in the data. 
An alternative perspective is that many of the phenomena we have noted could be 
explained by changes in the sectoral composition of the economy.  In this view, there were 
always some industries in which formal schooling in a technical field was nearly a prerequisite 
for significant invention, while in others inventors could make do with little or no formal 
schooling.  The latter industries, such as agriculture or light manufacturing, may have featured 
prominently in the early industrial economy, and thus created opportunities at invention for the 
under-schooled, but over time the more capital-intensive and science-based industries grew in 
importance.  The sectoral shifts then led to the dominance among great inventors of those trained 
in engineering or the natural sciences, as well as to the rise of R & D laboratories in large 
integrated companies.  Although some aspects of this account ring true, the estimates presented 
in Table 4 of variation in the educational backgrounds of the great inventors across sectors (and 
over time) suggest that changes in the sectoral composition of the economy offer little   25 
explanatory power.  Although inventors in the electrical/communications sector (that is, electrical 
machinery and equipment, telegraph, telephone, radio, etc.) were always slightly more likely to 
have studied engineering or a natural science, in general the differences across sectors seem very 
small.   Instead, the most striking pattern is that the educational backgrounds of inventors tended 
to move together over time, with each sector characterized by a marked increase in reliance on 
inventors educated in engineering or natural sciences during the last two birth cohorts.  Although 
our classification of patents by sector is more aggregated than we would like, the data suggest 
that the change in the composition of inventors overall was driven more by developments 
extending across all sectors, rather than by changes in the relative importance of different sectors.   
Table 5 presents further evidence of a broad change over time in who was responsible for 
the most important technological advances, and the growing significance of supporting 
investments in human and other capital.  As seen in the first panel of this table, there was a 
pronounced shift toward greater specialization at invention (and use of the patent system).  The 
typical great inventor born after 1820 had much longer careers at such activity than those born 
before, with nearly 60 percent of them receiving patents for more than 30 years (as opposed to 
roughly 37 percent for the earlier cohort).   Moreover, even controlling for the duration of career 
at invention, the later birth cohort generated many more patents.  This tendency toward greater 
specialization was likely encouraged by the growth of the market for technology (which raised 
the returns to invention, and also helped inventors who demonstrated creativity at research and 
development mobilize support) and the increased significance for being productive at invention 
of having accumulated specialized knowledge and human capital.
36  Changes in the age of first 
invention may also reflect these developments.  As indicated in the second panel of the table, 
over time great inventors began producing patented discoveries at somewhat younger ages, and   26 
on average those who got started earlier ultimately received many more patents over their careers 
(in total, and per year of career at invention).  Accounted for partially by a sharp drop off in the 
fraction of great inventors who filed their first patent at 35 or older, this distinct pattern seems to 
suggest that it became more important for the technologically creative to invest in specific human 
capital or establish a track record early if they were to be productive at invention in later years.  It 
is quite interesting, however, that the great inventors who were older at first patent were 
proportionally (relative to the number of patents they received) just as likely to receive citations 
for their achievements; the implication is the late-starters may have generated fewer inventions 
over their careers, but that the average quality of their discoveries was roughly equivalent to 
those who began inventing and patenting earlier in life.       
 
   IV. INSTITUTIONS, INVENTION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Invention was a remarkably democratic activity in the United States throughout the 19
th 
century.   Although individuals who had been able to study at institutions of higher learning were 
over-represented among great inventors, those with little in the way of formal schooling were 
major contributors to the progress of technology.  As we have argued before, this era of 
democratic invention owed much to the broad access to economic opportunities available in an 
environment where enterprises operated on a small scale, markets were rapidly expanding, and 
there were relatively modest barriers to entry.  In this paper, however, we called attention to a 
crucial feature of patent institutions whose role has not been fully appreciated.  The U.S. patent 
system was revolutionary in its extension of property rights in technology to an extremely wide 
spectrum of the population.  Moreover, it was exceptional in recognizing that it was in the public 
interest that patent rights, like other property rights, be clearly defined, well enforced, and easy to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
36 Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 1999a..   27 
transact in.  These were radical notions in a world accustomed to technology being a free good to 
all who had the capital to exploit it, except as limited by the authority of the government to 
arbitrarily grant a monopoly over it. It should be no surprise that they encountered fierce 
resistance in Old World Europe, at least until the exhibition at Crystal Palace intensified concern 
with the logic and design of intellectual property institutions.
37    
We have demonstrated the lack of support for the views of those 19
th century skeptics 
who contended that only an elite segment was capable of truly important invention, and therefore 
that an extension of property rights in technology to the general population would have no 
beneficial effect and might even retard the pace of technical progress.  Although few of the 
celebrated inventors in Britain were of humble origins, such individuals were well represented 
among the great inventors of the United States.  In the U.S., this group was more likely to invest 
in inventive activity, not only because of the relatively lower cost of obtaining a patent, but also 
because the examination system facilitated the use of a patent as a general asset that could be 
sold, licensed, or offered as collateral for finance.  This latter feature was of profound importance 
for technologically creative individuals who lacked the financial resources to exploit inventions 
directly.   In short, the patent system was a key institution in the progress of technology, but it 
also stands out as a conduit for creativity and achievement among otherwise disadvantaged 
groups.   
  It might be natural to ask whether, if the U.S. system of strong and broadly extended 
property rights in new technological knowledge was so effective at harvesting the technological 
creativity  of  its  population,  it  inspired  other  nations  to  adopt  such  a  purportedly  successful 
institutional innovation. As we have suggested, Britain and many other European countries did 
modify  their  patent  institutions,  especially  after  Crystal  Palace,  to  make  them  more  like  the 
                                                       
37 Machlup and Penrose 1950; Penrose 1951; and Rosenberg 1969.   28 
American system.  On the whole, however, this institutional convergence might be considered 
somewhat  slow,  especially  the  convergence  that  was  achieved  without  the  influence  of  the 
international patent  conventions convened over the last few decades of the 19
th century (see 
Table 6).  Japan and Germany, for example, stand out as the only leading economies that seem to 
have  enthusiastically  (in  their  initial  system  designs)  joined  the  U.S.  in  embracing  the 
examination system (though Russia and the Scandinavian countries also went in that direction, 
having been much influenced by the German system, with Canada in turn presumably affected by 
the U.S. practice).   How do we make sense of the pattern of institutional diffusion?   
  Tracing back at least as far as Simon Kuznets and Alexander Gerschenkron, scholars of 
long-term economic development have wondered whether follower countries naturally evolve, if 
not benefit from, a systematically different set of institutions than did the early industrializers.  
Gerschenkron’s analysis focused on capital market institutions, but some of his insights might 
well apply to the question of what sort of patent institutions the follower countries of the 19
th 
century should have adopted.
38  As with financial capital, follower countries likely had difficulty 
mobilizing  all  forms  of  capital  to  invest  in  inventive  activity  and  thus  it  was  perhaps  not 
unreasonable  for  them  to  choose  to  rely  on  technological  knowledge  from  abroad.  Early 
industrializers,  whose  populations  and  industries  were  more  familiar  with  the  frontiers  of 
technology, would not have been so inclined.               
  It should not be too surprising that those who came after tended to adopt patent systems 
that were more oriented toward securing flows of technology from outside the country, especially 
technological knowledge that was embodied in actual plant or production.  Except for the U.S, 
and a few relatively minor exceptions, nearly all societies had working requirements (or in a few 
                                                       
38Gerschenkron explicitly identified the ability to draw on the technologies developed in those countries that had 
industrialized earlier as one of the greatest advantages of economic backwardness.  See his classic essay, in   29 
cases compulsory licensing) as a central component of their patent systems.  Similarly, the great 
majority of follower countries had provisions for so-called patents of importation -- whereby 
those who were the first to introduce a new technology to the country (regardless of whether 
he/she was the inventor) from abroad could obtain a property right (typically lasting until the 
original  foreign  patent  on  the  technology  expired).
39    It  was  only  late  in  the  century,  after 
international patent conventions -- under pressure from the United States -- urged countries to 
adopt the principle that only inventors had the right to a patent, that such awards of property 
rights to the importer of a technology were disallowed.  Even then, many countries specified that 
the first applicant for a patent would be presumed to be the inventor.  
  Many  argue  that  extremely  underdeveloped  countries  should  have  no  interest  in 
maintaining a patent system, on the grounds that their citizens would not be very likely to make 
new contributions to technological knowledge, and thus the only impact would be to increase the 
flow abroad of licensing fees and other payments for the fruits of technology.  This attitude, 
however, has an uncomfortable resemblance to that early 19
th century view that ordinary people 
could not be expected to produce any truly significant new technical knowledge.  We have shown 
that the latter opinion was incorrect, and though circumstances today are very different, it is far 
from clear that strong patent systems in developing countries will fail to elicit a supply response 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Gerschenkron 1976, chpt. 1. 
39  Many of the follower countries assessed very high fees for patents (especially those that are less developed) at 
rates that are all the more remarkable for the relatively low per capita incomes prevailing there.  Indeed, many of the 
societies in Central and South America are distinguished for having among the highest fees in the world for patent 
protection, and the pattern holds across quite a range of national institutional heritages (Brazil, British Honduras, and 
Peru for example).  These fees might have been so high because the elites in these extremely unequal societies did 
not find it in their interest to provide broad access to property rights in new technology. Given that the number of 
outliers in Central and South America, where inequality in wealth and political influence was extreme, as compared 
to say Spain and Portugal (which also had rather low per capita incomes), this hypothesis should perhaps not be 
immediately dismissed.  It might be further noted that the influence of colonial heritage is not nearly so powerful as 
one might have expected.  There was, for example, enormous diversity in the characteristics of the patent systems of 
even the still remaining British colonies. Another rationale is that it provided an effective way of deriving 
government revenue at the expense of foreigners (who in many of these countries accounted for well over half of all 
patents).   30 
in domestic invention.  Moreover, one can also justify the implementation of an effective patent 
system if it were necessary make substantial investments to migrate technologies from abroad or 
if the cooperation or assistance of the original inventor was an important factor in diffusion.  
Although Taiwan of the mid-1980s was and is hardly typical of most developing countries, in his 
careful investigation of the strong patent system suddenly imposed on the country by the U.S., Lo 
offers persuasive evidence of a powerful response in expenditures on research and development, 
patenting by Taiwanese residents in the U.S., and foreign direct investment.
40   More study is 
needed, but it seems to us premature to dismiss the idea that there could be some formidable 
benefits  to  developing  countries  strengthening  their  protection  of  property  rights  to  new 




                                                       
40 Lo 2004. 
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FIGURE 1        
 
 
THE RATIO OF ALL ASSIGNMENTS TO PATENTS IN THE U.S., 
AS COMPARED TO THE RATIO OF ALL ASSIGNMENTS AND LICENSES TO PATENTS 






















Sources: U.S. Patent Office, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Patents. Washington, D.C.: 
G.P.O., various years; and Great Britain Patent Office. Annual report of the Commissioners of 
Patents [after 1883: Annual Report of the Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade 
Marks.]  London: H.M.S.O., various years.   
 




Regional Shares of Total Patents, Great Inventor Patents, and Population, 1790-1930 
 
 
     1790-1829   1830-1845   1846-1865  1866-1885  1886-1905  1906-1930 
                     (%)        (%)         (%)        (%)        (%)       (%)   





Patents          34.4%       30.1%         24.7%         19.7%         16.7%     11.4% 
G.I. Patents             55.1       34.1         29.6         29.1         29.1     18.3 
   Population         21.0       13.2         10.1           9.1           7.6       7.2 
 
 
Middle Atlantic   
   
Patents                    54.5               52.3                   48.3                 40.6                 37.6      30.8 
G.I. Patents             35.5               57.7                   55.7                 51.5                 41.1             62.0 





  Patents                     3.0                  8.3           20.8          30.3         34.5    36.8 
G.I. Patents              1.9                  3.2                   13.3                 13.6                 22.9         14.5 
Population               3.3                17.3                   29.2                 34.0                 36.0    32.6 
 
South     
Patents           8.1         9.2           5.1           6.0           6.8    10.8 
G.I. Patents             7.5                  5.0                     1.4                   1.5                   2.3      3.6 




Patents            --         --                     1.0           3.4           4.6    10.2 
  G.I. Patents               --                  --              0.0           2.9           2.7      1.6 





Notes and Sources: The population figures are from the decadal U.S. Census of Population.   The regional distribution 
of total patents was computed from the Patent Office Annual Reports.  The Great Inventor patents for the period 
before 1865 include all patents filed by great inventors to that date; after 1865 the distribution of great inventor patents 
refer to a sample of the patents obtained.   33 
 TABLE 2 
 




    PRE-1820 BIRTH COHORTS     POST-1820 BIRTH COHORTS 
           
Number     %        Number    % 
   
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Father' s Occupation 
 
        Inventors              Inventors 
 
Artisan                   17       15.6%      36    20.3% 
Farmer                    43        39.4        37    20.9 
 Eng/Mach/Inventor      9         8.3        25    14.1 
Professional /Merchant    28      25.7        61    34.7 
Manufacturer                 8         7.3        18    10.2 
Other                        4         3.7        --     -- 
 
 
Career Patents Received, by place of birth of inventor, and proportion of patents 
received in states other than place of birth    
 
           Patents        Patents 
 
Northern New England              92    87.0%     1697   97.6% 
Southern New England          537    55.5       1785   64.7 
New York           213      34.7       1872   58.3 
Pennsylvania        45    64.4        459    67.6 
Southern Middle Atlantic         118    91.5        266    60.3 
South                   48    64.4        260    87.0   
Midwest/West        34    44.1      2670    89.6 
Foreign Country        91          100.0      3483          100.0 
 
 
Notes and Sources:  See text. 
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       FIGURE 2 
 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF ‘GREAT INVENTOR’ PATENTS  
 










Notes and Sources: See the note to Table 3 and text. 
 
 
EDUCATION By Birth Cohort: 










1739-1794 1795-1819 1820-1845  1846-1865  1866-1885
Primary Secondary
Nontech Coll Technical  35 
TABLE 3 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF ‘GREAT INVENTOR’ PATENTS BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION AND 
THE MAJOR WAY IN WHICH THE INVENTOR EXTRACTED RETURNS OVER THEIR 
CAREERS: BY BIRTH COHORTS, 1739-1885 
________________________________________________________________________ 
        Level of Education  
Birth Cohort             Primary          Second.           College        Eng/NatSci.    Tot   
 
1739-1794  (row %)  69.5     6.8    12.5    11.3      400 
    avg. career  patents     5.6     3.8      6.5          5.2        75 
 
    sell/license   (col. %)   54.9    11.1    84.0    17.7    51.4%       
    prop/direct   (col. %)   36.5    74.1         2.0     44.7        35.6% 
    employee   (col. %)      6.2       7.4      --       --            4.8% 
 
1795-1819  (row %)  59.1    19.3      5.4    16.2      709 
 avg. career  patents    20.0               14.4               17.3               12.1            80  
 
sell/license   (col. %)    58.2    81.0    42.1    60.4     62.1%       
prop/direct   (col. %)    33.2    10.2       47.4     24.3         28.1% 
employee     (col. %)        8.4       8.8      --     13.5           8.8% 
       
1820-1845   (row %)  39.2    34.7    16.3      9.7    1221   
    avg. career patents               41.8               44.0               29.4               23.7          145 
 
sell/license (col. %)    50.7    31.8    37.4    72.8     44.0% 
prop/direct (col. %)    42.3    55.2       47.7     19.3         45.5% 
employee   (col. %)        7.7     13.0    14.9       7.0         10.2% 
  
1846-1865   (row %)  22.2    24.5    20.9     32.4    1438 
    avg. career patents            158.3              73.6              78.6               55.3         80 
 
sell/license (col. %)   94.5    68.5    46.2    57.1     66.0% 
prop/direct (col. %)       5.5    18.6       52.8     16.9        22.6% 
employee   (col. %)         --     12.9      --     23.6        10.4% 
 
1866-1885      (row %)    0.2    17.9    21.4    60.5      574 
    avg. career patents           --            144.5              53.6            155.7        26   
 
sell/license (col. %)         --      1.0    46.3    40.1      34.3% 
prop/direct (col. %)            100.0    98.1       49.6     18.7         39.7% 
employee   (col. %)        --       1.0      4.1     41.2         26.0%      
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Notes and Sources Table 1:  See the text. The table reports: the distribution of great inventor 
patents across the schooling class of the patentee, by the birth cohort of the inventor; the average 
number of patents received by each inventor, by birth cohort and schooling class; and the 
distribution of patents across the principal method of the inventor extracting income, by birth 
cohort and schooling class.  The numbers of patents and great inventors are reported in italics for 
each birth cohort.  The classification of the way income was extracted was arrived at through a 
close reading of the biographies, and refers to the overall career of the inventor (all of his or her 
patents).  The categories include: inventors who frequently sold or licensed the rights to the 
technologies they patented; those who sought to directly extract the returns by being a principal in 
a firm that used the technology in production or produced a patented product; and those who were 
employees of such a firm.  We have omitted a category for those inventors who seem to have made 
no effort to extract income from their inventions.  Our overall sample of ‘great inventors’ was 
constructed in two waves.  In the first (160 inventors), consisting primarily of those born before 
1821, we collected the information for all of the patents they received through 1865, and retrieved 
the information on the number they received after 1865 for our estimates of the total career patents.  
In the second wave (249 inventors), we collected patents from every fifth year through 1930, and 
thus will be missing the patents received late in the careers of those of our inventors who were 
born in the 1870s and 1880s.   
 
  




DISTRIBUTION OF ‘GREAT INVENTOR’ PATENTS ACROSS SECTOR  
 
AND EDUCATION OF INVENTOR: BY BIRTH COHORT, 1739-1885 
 
 
     Agric  Const/CivEng  Elec/Comm  Manuf  Transp  Miscell 
1739-1794                  #patents        33        27          4     209     99    25 
         Sector share of Patents      8.3%        6.8%        1.0%    52.6%    24.9%    6.3% 
         Primary (col. %)    60.6      59.3        --     69.4    73.7  84.0 
         College (col.%)      9.1      11.1    100.0    12.4    13.1    4.0 
         Eng/Nat Sci. (col. %)    15.2      14.8         --    13.4      7.1    4.0 
             
1795-1819                  #patents       61        37           6     316    218     67 
         Sector share of Patents      8.7%        5.3%        0.9%    44.8%    30.9%    9.5% 
         Primary (col. %)    68.9      70.3      66.7     56.7    52.3  76.1 
         College (col.%)    21.3        5.4        --      5.4      --    9.0 
         Eng/Nat Sci. (col. %)      4.9      24.3       33.3    14.6    21.6  11.9 
             
1820-1845                  #patents       98       110         73     659    118   144 
         Sector share of Patents      8.2%        9.2%        6.1%    54.8%      9.8%   12.8% 
         Primary (col. %)    24.5      41.8      11.0     44.8    49.2  27.1 
         College (col.%)    23.5        6.4      23.3    10.8    17.8  38.2 
         Eng/Nat Sci. (col. %)      2.0      20.9       17.8      9.0      7.6    6.9 
             
1846-1865                 #patents       40        154      413     430    261   128 
         Sector share of Patents      2.8%      10.8%      29.0%    30.2%    18.3%    9.0% 
         Primary (col. %)      5.0      31.2      28.8     27.9      6.5    6.3 
         College (col.%)      7.5      19.5        7.8    13.3    35.3  66.4 
         Eng/Nat Sci. (col. %)    42.5      35.1       37.5    23.0    33.3    6.3 
             
1866-1885                #patents         7         44      133     213      87     83 
         Sector share of Patents       1.2%        7.8%      23.5%    37.6%    15.3%  14.6% 
         Primary (col. %)        --        --        --      --      --    -- 
         College (col.%)     28.6        6.8      49.6    23.0      --    2.4 
         Eng/Nat Sci. (col. %)     71.4      75.0       50.4    67.6    90.8  18.1 
 
 
Notes and Sources:  See the text and the note to Table 1.  The distributions of patents across 
sectors of intended use are reported for each birth cohort of inventors.  Within each sector and 
birth cohort, the table reports the distribution of patents across the educational level of the great 
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TABLE 5 
 
AGE AND DURATION OF CAREER AT INVENTION, BY BIRTH COHORT 
 
 
    PRE-1820 BIRTH COHORTS    POST-1820 BIRTH COHORTS 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
         
 
Length of Career at Invention (yrs between first and last patent) 
      _____________________________________________________________ 
     # of     %          avg       # of            %         avg 
    inventors          career pats      inventors        career pats 
                         _____________________________________________________________ 
0-5 years      37    23.1%         1.7 pats    22  8.5%         2.2 pats 
6-10           8           5.0         3.5       8  3.1          6.0 
11-20        21    13.1         6.1     36  13.8        25.9 
21-30        35    21.9         9.3      45  17.3        30.6 
> 30 years      59     36.9       23.9     149   57.3        83.5 
 
 
  Age at First Invention 
________________________________________________________________________ 
   # of      %    avg          avg          # of          %        avg   avg 
   inventors  career pats    citations      inventors    career pats   citations 
 ________________________________________________________________________ 




<  20      8       5.0%     9.6    1.0        3         1.2%         117.7  8.7   
20-24    22     13.8           19.0  0.7       35           13.7          130.6  9.9   
25-29    22     13.8    20.0  0.4       72       27.7            64.8        4.2 
30-34   35     21.9    17.8  0.5       66       25.4            46.1  4.0 
35-39      28     17.5      7.3  0.3       33       12.7            39.0  2.5 
40-44   14       8.8      5.9  0.1       18         6.9            28.7  2.8 
45-55   21     13.1      4.6  0.0       18         6.9            19.9  1.4     
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
         
Notes and Sources: See Text and footnotes to other tables.   
   39 
TABLE 6 
 
SOME DESCRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF PATENT SYSTEMS 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
          Examination         Working Req.   Pats for Import or   Cost 





  1871    -      Y      Y    $$ 
  1899    Y      Y      N    $$$$ 
 
Belgium   
  1848    N      Y      Y    $$$ 
  1871    N      Y      Y    $$$ 
  1899    N      Y      N    $$ 
Denmark 
  1871    -      Y      –    $$ 
  1899    Y      Y      N    $$ 
France 
  1848    N      Y      Y    $$$ 
  1871    N      Y      –    $$$ 
  1899    N      Y      N    $$$ 
Germany 
  1891    Y      Y      N    $$$$ 
  1899    Y      Y      N    $$$$ 
Great Britain 
  1848    N      Y      Y    $$$$ 
  1871    N      Y      Y    $$$$ 
  1899    N      Y      N    $$$$ 
Italy 
  1871    N      Y      Y    $$ 
  1891    N      Y      Y    $$$ 
  1899    N      Y      Y    $$$ 
 
Norway 
  1871    --      Y      --    $$ 
  1899    Y      Y      N    $$ 
 
Portugal 
  1848    N      Y      Y    $ 
  1899    N      Y      Y    $ 
 
Prussia 
  1871    -      Y      N    $$ 
 
Russia 
  1871    -      Y      Y    $$$$ 
  1899    Y      Y      Y    $$$$   40 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
         Examination        Working Req.        Pats for Import or         Cost 
              System        or Compul Lic.                  Intro. Of Technology 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Spain 
1848    N      Y      Y    $$$ 
  1871    N      Y      Y    $$$ 
  1899    N      Y      Y    $$ 
 
Sweden 
  1848    --      Y      Y    — 
  1871    --      Y      –    $$ 
  1899    Y      Y      N    $$ 
 
 
        SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA 
Argentina 
  1891    N      Y      Y    $$$$ 
 
Brazil 
  1871    N      Y      Y    $$$ 
  1891    N      Y      --    $$$$ 
  1899    N      Y      N    $$$$ 
 
Br. Guiana 
  1891    N      N      –    $$$$ 
 
Br. Honduras   
  1891    N      N      –    $$$$ 
 
Chile 
  1891    N      Y      –    $$$ 
 
Colombia 
  1891    N      Y      –    $$$ 
 
Cuba 
  1871    N      Y      Y    $$$ 
 
Ecuador 
  1891    N      Y      Y    $$ 
 
Guatemala 
  1891    N      Y      Y    $$$ 
 
Mexico 
  1871    N      Y      N    $$$$ 
  1899    N      N      N    $$$$ 
 
Peru    1891    N      Y      N    $$$$   41 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
         Examination        Working Req.     Pats for Import or   Cost 
             System       or Compul Lic.              Intro of Technology 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Uruguay 
  1891    N      Y      –    $$$$ 
 
Venezuela 





  1891    N      Y      –    $$$ 
 
Canada 
  1871    --      Y      N    $ 
  1899    Y      Y      N    $ 
 
Fiji 
  1891    N      N      –    $$ 
 
Hawaii 
  1891    Y*      N      Y    $$ 
 
India 
  1891    N      Y      –    $$$$ 
 
Jamaica 
  1891    N      Y      –    $$$ 
 
Japan 
  1899    Y      Y      N    $$ 
 
Liberia 
  1891    Y*      Y      –    $$$ 
 
New South Wales 
  1891    N      N      N    $ 
 
New Zealand 
  1891    N      Y      N    $$ 
 
South Africa 
  1891    N      N      --    $$$ 
 
United States 
  1848    Y      N      N    $ 
  1899    Y      N      N    $ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________   42 
 
Notes and Sources: 
 
* Although this country officially had an examination system, its patent office does not appear to 
have carried out a serious examination of applications for novelty or utility. 
 
1848: John Kingsley and Joseph Piesson, Laws and Practice of All Nations and Governments Relating to Patents of 
Inventions (New York: Kingsley and Piesson, 1848). 
 
1871: United States and International Patent Office Manual (New York: Fitch and Co., 1871). 
 
1891: Epitome of the World’s Patent Laws and Statistics (New York: The British and European Patent Agency, 1891). 
 
1899: Arthur Greeley, Foreign Patent and Trademark Laws (Washington, D.C.: John Byrne and Co., 1899). 
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